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BOOK REVIEWS

LAW AND THE LIBERAL ARTS. Edited by Albert Broderick, O.P.
Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1967. Pp. 229
+ xxix. Paper $6.50.

The law and the liberal arts-if one is to accept that there is
an adequate distinction between the two concepts even in education-are both hodgepodges, partly because they both have changed
continuously as concepts and as realities over millenia, and neither
has stopped changing yet. Satisfactory exploration of the links between two shifting and perhaps inadequately distinguishable complexities will tax the most subtle and best informed mind: the
reader should not bring to the present bravely titled hodgepodge,
Law and the Liberal Arts, exptectations too sanguine or hopes too
high.
Whatever the subject, on the other hand, perhaps no relatively
small book by fifty-four authors can leave the reader altogether
satisfied with its movement of thought or the sharpness of its focus;
when many of the authors have contributed not as writers but as
speakers transcribed, the reader may well begin to think that he
has really not had a book in his hands at all, but something disguised as a book. ("Oh God," the late T. S. Eliot is reported to
have exclaimed to a publisher-proud of her firm's products-in
private conversation at Harvard in the mid-50's, "You called them
books. Another word gone.")
The count of fifty-four is rough and not guaranteed. Of the
seventy-nine persons who apparently participated in the conference
(held at Catholic University in December, 1964) which gave rise
to the present publication, a few seem to have remained silent;
the majority spoke out, had their words inexorably transcribed, and
find themselves just as inexorably fixed in print by an editor whose
fidelity to transcription excludes the mending of impromptu grammar or even the correction of the sometimes inept punctuation of
the recorder. "The dialog has, where possible, been reported as
delivered," is that editor's assertion in his preface, as though someone might find this fact worthy of praise or at the very least
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grounds for exculpating him. In view of what he found possible,
one cannot help speculating as to whether impossibility lay in some
unimaginably shocking solipsism or some gross profanity inappropriate to the place. The most gingery expletive reproduced is "By
gum." From the notes to the nine chapters, where references to
the transcript are given, it is clear that the editor indeed left out
large parts of the conference. He should have left out more.
The eleven sections of "dialog" and discussion demonstrate
amply that without the inflections, gestures, pauses, and stresses
that can make it both lucid and engaging when spoken, informal
English is often uncommonly hard to follow in print, and sometimes unendurable. When entire pages of the stufff lack any pertinent
relation to the ostensible subject, the reader has good grounds to
curse the editor for including them. "We priests nowadays," one
learns on p. 171 from the Dean of Catholic Univeristy's School of
Sacred Theology, "have a terrififc problem with seminarians, you
just can't let them run loose at every whim. They just want everything without discretion; you give them an inch and they take a
yard." To this a Georgetown Jesuit replies, "I agree with you to
some extent, but not entirely," and supports his position with an
account of his difficulties in reaching seminarians by telephone
after 9:30 p. m. This scarcely pertinent exchange is unfortunately
characteristic of Chapter VII, misnamed "Activity in Related Disciplines." Here Father Broderick acknowledges "gratefully," as well
he might, that another hand edited the text from a full transcript
of a "workshop"; the reader would be well advised to pass it over
altogether. Anyone with a special interest in the current introspections and household squabbles concerning social awareness or
legalism or liberal thought in Catholic education is likely to learn
more by reading the letters in one issue of the National Catholic
Reporter. The end of Chapter VII is notable, however, for having
the book's only discussion of the natural and physical sciences,
surely a very large part of the liberal arts. That discussion takes
less than a page and a half, and ends with this statement-its
punctuation gives it an engaging flavor of archaic rhetoric-by
Mark S. Massel of the Brookings Institute: "Then are we in agreement that it would be desirable with respect to any future planning
to make mention at least of the natural and physical sciences."
So much for that part of the liberal arts. Literature is mentioned in at least one sentence (in Chapter III); history is referred
to, usually vaguely, perhaps six or seven times; the communicative
skills are given a nod by more than one contributor, sometimes
with the traditional lament that law students are not better equipped
than they are to speak or write honest and effective English, a

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

lament that would come with more grace in a decently written
book. There is some talk about the behavioral sciences, especially
psychology. Music and art and theatre may be mentioned, but if
so, it is not in any memorable way. Philosophy fares somewhat
better, since several contributors find ethics important, and particularly because the only Frenchman at the conference, M. Michel
Villey of the Faculte de Droit et des Sciences Economiques of the
University of Paris, chose to use the occasion for a diffident defense
or Aristotelianism. and an uncertain attack on nominalism, both
delivered as though he were not quite sure that anyone was attacking
the one or preparing to defend the other. (In passing, M. Villey
seems to want to credit William of Ockham with inventing the
word modernus, but this odd attribution may be nothing more than
a Francophone turn of phrase.)
The explanation for the uneven concern with the liberal arts lies
in the circumstance that the conference had a title different from
and more fitting than that of the book: "Law in the Liberal Arts:
the Social Dimension." There is in the book no hint why the preposition was changed to a conjunction and the specific focus dropped
from the title.
With the right title, without Chapter VII and the remaining
nine sections of transcribed improvisation, this would be a valuable
(and much smaller) book. The reader then would regret principally
that the substantive papers are themselves not longer: they come
from some very subtle and well informed minds.
In the Introduction, Dr. Gustave Arlt's "Historical Survey of
Interdisciplinary Studies" ought to be ten times its length; the
learned president of the Council of Graduate Schools provides in
the two pages allowed him too brief a review-but a good one-of
the progressive breakdown since about 1940 of rigid departmental
and disciplinary lines in universities.
In Chapter I, "Law, Society and Values," Mr. Adolf Berle
rhapsodizes humanistically-it all seems rather sad four years later
-- over the promise of the Great Society, and, as usual, Mr. Berle's
words deserve respect and attention. M. Villey of Paris, as has
been noted, flees in the traditional manner of Aristotelians when
no man pursues, but still provides a useful insight into the realist
postulates of French legal theory. Mr. Robert McDonald, a New
York lawyer, affirms the attitudinal, and hence moral, element in
the education and practice of the lawyer, who must, he maintains,
be a generalist. He may be right in suggesting that specialists need
not or cannot be quite so moral.
Chapter II has four men describe briefly and informally the
graduate study experiments in law and the social sciences supported
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by the Russell Sage Foundation at Northwestern, Denver, Wisconsin,
and Berkeley. Professors Victor Rosenblum, Robert Yegge, Harry
Ball, and Philip Selznick (from the four universities, in the order
named) tell enough about the respective programs to stimulate the
reader's curiosity to the point that he will want to seek more detailed and later accounts of these interdisciplinary undertakings.
The place in the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum of law
courses or courses with legal content is the subject of Chapters III
through VI, with some twenty variegated teachers modestly defending one or another position, none of them at sufficient length or
with enough conviction to convince-or perhaps even really informa reader not previously informed and convinced. But if diffidence
and brevity uniformly weaken the presentations, these remain interesting for both collective breadth and individual elements or
reportage.
Chapter VIII is all improvisation, but not as long or as embarrassingly parochial as Chapter VII. It goes under the ambitious title
of "Faculty Training, Area Planning, the Small Colleges." One could
summarize it by saying that the members of the conference saw
difficulties under these three headings, but thought there would be
solutions. Professor Harry Ball of Wisconsin does some good propagandizing for the then recently incorporated Law and Society Association, and the reader observes with satisfaction (as though he
were at a play) that Professor Steven Frankino of the Catholic
University Law School was moved to seek membership on the spot.
In Chapter IX the conference chairman, Mr. Mark Massel, presents two summaries of proposals arising from the conference, the
first done right there and the second apparently put together afterwards. The second is, of course, more inclusive, to the point that
it appears to summarize things not said at the conference. A dramatic afterword by the editor alleges at once that liberal arts
educators do not see law as "that most dynamic social and moral
system where fact and value meet," and that they should see it
that way.
This should have been a much better book: some of the parts
are transcendently better than the whole, and suffer from their
setting. But then they would perhaps not have come into being
without the conference, or been made available to general readers
without the publication. And there is much information and light to
be found here, if the reader is willing to pay a certain price for it.
BERNARD O'KELLY*

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of North Dakota; B.A. University of
Montreal; L. Ph. College de l'Innaculee Conception; M.A., Ph.D. Harvard University.
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OF

INSANITY,

by Rita James

Simon. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. Pp. 269. $10.00. 1967.
This is the third book-length report to come out of the University
of Chicago Law School's Jury Project.' Its purpose, like that of
its predecessors and the Project as a whole, is to get some facts
to contribute to the apparently interminable, often exasperatingly
theological debate over the jury as a decision-maker in the judicial
process. The theme is stated in the preface to the first of these
reports, Delay in the Court: "The study, like that of the jury project
generally, has a special emphasis: the partnership of the lawyer
with the social scientist in a fact-oriented inquiry." That book
began as a study of the role of the jury in creating or perpetuating
one of the most pressing problems of judicial administration, and
became finally an exhaustive study of all the factors contributing
to delay in a single judicial system. The second report, The American
Jury, was a comprehensive study of the functioning of the jury
in criminal cases. This book investigates the functioning of the
jury in that numerically small but theoretically and systematically
crucial portion of criminal cases involving the defense of insanity.
The lawyer-social scientist partnership in the project is evident
and pervasive: Harry Kalven, Jr., co-author of Delay in the Court
and of The American Jury, and co-director of the project, is a
lawyer and Profefssor of Law at the University of Chicago; Hans
Zeisel, also co-director and co-author of the first two reports, is a
sociologist and Professor of Law and Sociology at the University
of Chicago; Rita James Simon is a sociologist and Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois. Those assisting in
the project include lawyers, sociologists, social psychologists, administrators.
The three reports illustrate the variety of approaches which
can be subsumed under the heading of "social science methodology":
Delay in the Court utilized primarily court records and statistics
compiled by the courts for their own administrative purposes, subjected to intensive factorial analysis; The American Jury analyzed
answers to a long and complex questionnaire filled out by judges
sitting in actual criminal jury cases, showing their own view of the
case and trying to explain why the jury reached the decision it
reached; The Jury and the Defense of Insanity alone used an experimental method, playing recordings of simulated cases to juries and
analyzing verdicts, questionnaires and deliberations. There can be
no doubt that Mrs. Simon's book, quite as much as its predecessors,
1. ZEisEL, KALvxN & Bu cOLZ, DRL y IN THE COURT, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1959; KALvEN & ZsISut, TuR AMERICAN JURY, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1966.
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makes a contribution to the literature which no serious discussion
of the subject in the future can afford to ignore.
As a sociologist, Professor Simon is concerned with understanding
the factors which influence the decision of the jury, and the book
attends to a wide variety of them. Of greatest interest to the legal
profession generally, however, is her attempt experimentally to test
one of the key assumptions in a debate which today is absorbing
the attention of the bar, the judiciary and the legislatures in many
American jurisdictions, namely, that over the formulation of the
insanity defense in criminal cases.
It is assumed by nearly all participants in this debate that the
abstract formulation is important and that how it is formulated
will influence the decision in particular cases, especially where the
jury decides. Does it actually make any difference to the jury how
the defense of insanity is formulated? Does the juror's understanding
of a particular formulation differ in any significant respect from
the judge's or the lawyer's? Which formulation most closely corresponds to the juryman's own conception of the just disposition
of such cases? Which formulation permits the greatest latitude for
the professional analysis and opinion of the expert psychiatric witness who is now becoming the keystone of any criminal trial in
which the defense of insanity is raised? Is the jury able to understand and utilize expert testimony in its freest form, or is it necessary, as some have argued, to force expert testimony into relatively
simple molds in order for the jury to be able to make use of it?
As in any experiment, the method is crucial, and no doubt
much of the discussion of this book which is bound to ensue will
center around the method used. Two basic criminal cases were
constructed: One a housebreaking case adapted from the famous
United States v. Durham,2 and the other an incest case, adapted
from another actual case from the District of Columbia. Trial
transcripts of each were then prepared, varied according to the
experimental variables sought to be tested, produced for tape recording (apparently by law students and professors) and played
before juries drawn from panels serving normal jury duty in Chicago,
St. Louis and Minneapolis. The jurors each filled out a questionnaire
before the trial showing background and attitudes toward issues
involved in the cases; another questionnaire was filled out immediately following the "trial" and before deliberations; deliberations
were tape recorded; group verdicts were taken; and a post-deliberation questionnaire was filled out by each juror. Each variation of
each trial was played to anywhere from 5 to 30-odd juries, so that
statistical analysis of a crude but useful sort was possible. The
2.

214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), opinion by Bazelon, J.
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experimenters are confident from their observations that the jurors
took their jobs seriously, so that what they did can be taken as
indicative of what a jury would do with a "live" case of similar
content.
There were two major variables in the experiment: the formulation of the insanity defense in the judge's instructions, and the
scope and depth of the expert psychiatric testimony on the issue.
A third variable used only in the incest case was whether or not
the jury was informed in the instructions that the defendant, if
found guilty by reason of insanity, would be committed to a mental
institution rather than simply set free. Two additional variables
were present in the cases, but not fully tested in the experimental
design: first, the nature of the crime charged-the relatively unexceptional offense of housebreaking compared with the rather heinous
crime of incest; and second, the nature of the mental illness
involved-the housebreaker was diagnosed as psychotic and delusional, while the defendant in the incest case was diagnosed as a
psychoneurotic who loses control only over specific urges. Both of
these last are important, and presently much speculated over: the
more heinous offenses are supposed to raise more strongly the
conflict between the desire for revenge and the feeling that a person
who commits such a crime must be sick; and it is widely assumed
that the distinction between psychosis, usually involving a cognitive
"break with reality," and neurosis, involving a loss of emotional
control, is psychiatrically valuable one which also happily corresponds to the "knowledge of right and wrong" criterion thought
to be the keystone of M'Naghten. To have incorporated these variables fully into the experimental design here reported would no doubt
have unreasonably complicated the already impressive task performed by Professor Simon and her co-workers. We can hope,
however, that these tantalizing questions will soon be subjected to
the full experimental treatment.
Three different formulations of the insanity defense were submitted to juries in the instructions. One was based on the formulation
established by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case in 1843,
since that time the most widely-adopted rule in the Anglo-American
legal world:
• . . [T] o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know
it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong. 3
3.

10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 (1843),

8 Eng. Rep. 722.
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Another formulation utilized was that expounded by the District of
Columbia Circuit in Durham v. United States, which in turn dates
4
back to the 1869 New Hampshire case of State v. Pike:
The rule we now hold is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.These are, in the author's view, the two formulations which
are presently functioning competitors for favor in the AngloAmerican legal world. The third formulation utilized in the experiment is designated by Professor Simon as the "uninstructed" version: "If you believe the defendant was insane at the time he
committed the act of which he is accused, then you must find the
defendant not guilty by reason of insanity." With this instruction
the author sought to test the capacity of the jury to reach a sensible
conclusion without the assistance of an authoritative formulation off
the relationship between responsibility and mental illness. Such a
rule, non-existent in Anglo-American jurisdictions at present, is apparently followed, for example, in France.6
A reader might wonder why the experiment did not include a
third actual competitor in the list of alternate formulations, which
was formulated in 1955 (a year after the Durham case) by the
American Law Institute:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the require7
ments of law.
This formulation is proving a more successful competitor than the
Durham Rule; only Maine and the Virgin Islands have adopted the
Durham rule in addition to New Hampshire, while The American
Law Institute formulation has been adopted in at least 5 states
(Illinois, Vermont, Missouri, Massachusetts, and Maryland) and at
least two federal circuits (the 2d and the 10th), as well as in part
by New York and the 3rd federal circuit. 8
The A.L.I. formula is mentioned only in a footnote to a
"postscript," and no explanation is given for the failure of the
4. 49 N.H. 899 (1869). A leading Influence on this decision was the Maine psychiatrist, Isaac Ray, whose remarkable pioneering treatise THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
INSANITY was then In its 4th edition. The first edition, (1844) edited by Dr. Winfred
Overholser and supplemented by portions of later editions (the 5th came out in 1871),
was reprinted by the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press in 1962.
5. 214 F.2d 862, 874-5 (1954).
6. French Penal Code § 64: "If the person charged with the commission of a felony
or misdemeanor was then insane or acted by absolute necessity, no offense has been committed." THE FRENCH PENAL CODE 39 (Mueller Ed.) (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1960'.
7. AMERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
8. See GoLsTm, THE INSANIrY DEFENSE 88 (1967).
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experiment to include it. The explanation may lie in a feeling that
it is really nothing more than a refinement of M'Naghten as modified by the so-called "irresistible impulse test" (here "substantial
capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of law"),
and therefore not worth testing separately. This assumption may
have been strengthened by part (2) of the A.L.I. rule, which seems
to be an attempt to exclude the controversial psychopathic or sociopathic personality from the ranks of the mentally ill, as does the
strictest M'Naghten approach: "As used in this Article, the terms
'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct." Whatever the intention, however, the category as described seems to be
an empty one from the psychiatric point of view, since other symptoms are almost always found in persons diagnosed as psychopathic
personalities. Another possible explanation is that the basic design
of the experiment seems to have been fixed prior to 1960, and that
the A.L.I. formula did not look then as lively as it does now.
In any case, the utilization in the A.L.I. proposal of the
vaguer but more functional terms "substantial capacity," "appreciate," and "conform" to avoid the supposed rigidities of the
M'Naughten rule would make it a prime candidate for the kind of
testing undertaken here, to see whether any practical advantage
is gained by such modifications. This would be particularly so since
the author seems to have been attracted by the polarity of M'Naghten
as the layman's view and Durham as the more advanced psychiatrist's, and could therefore have made use of an attempted
compromise for comparison.
The variation in psychiatric testimony took two forms: first,
the content of the testimony had to vary at least in the conclusion
reached according to the formulation of the insanity defense under
which the trial operated; second, the experimenters utilized two
different styles of testimony, which designated "model" and
"typical," the model testimony including a much more extensive
history of the patient/defendant's illness, the typical testimony on
the other hand merely a classification of current symptoms according to accepted diagnostic categories. About half of the juries hearing
each variety of legal rule heard model testimony and about halff
heard the so-called typical testimony.
For the lawyer, at least for the lawyer who has been involved
in insanity defense cases and/or has expended an appreciable
amount of intellectual energy reflecting on the problems, theoretical
and practical, which the insanity defense raises, there may be relatively few surprises in the experimental data produced in Professor
Simon's book. If it can be taken as a farily reliable criterion for
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identifying the well-designed, conscientiously executed experiment
on large social questions that the results are undramatic or inconclusive, and it seems to this reviewer to be the case, this experiment
merits praise. The objective and detailed analysis confirms that the
problem is real and the solution not obvious, and this confirmation
is of considerable value. Perhaps even more importantly, from the
point of view of one not yet thoroughly familiar with the issue, a
study of the experimental design and of the author's analysis of
the information gleaned from it provides a new approach to understanding the problem, for it translates a thorough analysis of the
theory into a prescription for developing further data. That the
prescription is not immediately filled does not exhaust its worth.
Professor Simon's book, indeed, contains more than a mere
description of an experiment. It begins with an historical sketch of
the development of the law on the subject, adds a helpful and
enlightening discussion of the problems involved in constructing a
test, and concludes with a scholarly report of the actual experiences
of the District of Columbia with administrating the Durham rule.
A hawk-eyed lawyer can detect signs that the author is a sociologist
and not a lawyer, and there a few errors in reporting (e.g., the
assertion that Vermont has adopted Durham, rather than A.L.I.);
but these chapters are valuable aids to the reader's basic understanding. A useful bibliography on the insanity defense is also
appended.
For the lawyer, the most fascinating part of the book might
nonetheless be the first appendix, setting forth a transcript, only
slightly edited, of the entire deliberation of one of the juries which
heard the incest case under the "uninstructed" version of the defense with the full or "model" version of the psychiatric testimony.
The author supplies it to us not as typical, but as interesting; and
it is most assuredly interesting. Whether this deliberation, along
with Professor Simon's chapter generally describing the juries'
deliberations, leaves the reader heartened or discouraged about the
jury as a decision-making body will probably depend on his own
predilections about the necessity of scientific expertise and scholarly
detachment in reading fundamental social decisions. That the jurymen took their job seriously, and that they made a real effort to
bring the information given them to bear on their decision, and that
the deliberations do in fact involve an accommodation of conflicting
attitudes and prejudices, seem to this reviewer to be amply
confirmed.
WILLIAM B. FIsCH*
0 Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. A.B. 1957, Harvard College; LL.B. 1960, University of Illinois; M.Comp.L. 1962, University of Chicago.
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PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, by Alan Westin. Atheneum, New York.
Pp. 487. 1967.
Alan Westin's book could be a landmark. Some of his reviewers
think it is. Already PRIVACY AND FREEDOM has made the major
leagues of the book review columns. It covers a wide spectrum,
some sociology, a little bit of anthropology, a lot of good reporting
and a lot of law. So far most of the reviews have treated it as a
book of general interest. I have tried to appraise it as a book for
lawyers.
Even a lawyer can like a book for its good reading. This one
will not make the best seller list on that score. Much of it is tough
going with repetition, summarizing and restating. A reader is never
likely to forget the general plan of the book. Nevertheless, there
is fascinating stuff on eavesdropping, camera spying, psychology
tests and the pervasive effects of computer data gathering on individuals and reputations. My guess is that non-lawyer readers will
concentrate on Part Two of the book, "New Tools for Invading
Privacy". Perhaps most of us want to believe that some day we
shall do all of our buying with credit cards. It could be fun to
live without money, but it will not be fun to live with character
analysis by machines.
I can be exaggerating the picture Westin draws in these fascinating chapters of the using of detection machines and the giving
of psychology tests to employees and applicants for employment.
All kinds of people use all of these devices, crime stoppers, private
detectives, business men, politicians and curious people who are
just plain nosy about their neighbors. What can we do about it,
and what are we trying to do? The author thinks we can do much
through legislation, administrative supervision and court decisions,
all of which can add up to an accumulation of ground rules that
can be worse than the irritants.
I am thinking of an experience of mine many years ago in
Wisconsin, where the judges boast that they do not recognize a
right of privacy. Someone snapped a picture of me in a nightclub.
I wanted to propose a legislative scheme for the licensing of camera
users. There would be a code of regulations. On the showing of a
violation the user's license would be revoked. Criminal sanctions
would be imposed against anyone using a candid camera without
a license. Multiply all that by other kinds of gadget using that
should be licensed. What a system! Ground rules for the sake of
ground rules. I see a little bit of that in Westin's proposals for
combating the using of tools that can invade privacy.
Nevertheless, the problems Westin describes are real. They
need discussion and exploring. We can count on some old-fashioned
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common law analogies to help, and we can add some administrative supervision over the using of machines in public agencies.
Bugging, camera spying, computer analyzing is dirty stuff. It can
be rejected as evidence in criminal and civil cases. It is such dirty
stuff that it can be like high-pressure debt collecting, the using of
pictures for commercial purposes without consent and the digging
up for publication of salacious rubbish that is no longer news.
Bugging and camera using can be torts. If we have to settle
for legislation, let it be specific. Let the legislature put its finger
on what it would proscribe, and let the sanction be a civil suit
for damages.
All of what we are suggesting and all that Westin suggests
will not erase conditions that are imminent in a world where all
of us live close to our neighbors' back yards. We are all used to
living under conditions that are never more than approximately
good. Two possibilities can help to make the world and its communities better for everyone: drastic population control and an
ecumenical movement even more comprehensive and simple than
the vision of Pope John. Presently I think we will have to settle
for more newspaper reporting, more law talk by lawyers and some
simple common law restraints.
VERNON X.

0

Dean of the Catholic University of America School of Law.

MILLER*

